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Juvenile Discovery: A Developing
Trend and a Word of Caution
DIANE GERAGHTY*
The use of discovery is acknowledged as essential to the efficient admin-
istration of justice and to the fairness of the adversary system in both civil
and criminal proceedings. However, the juvenile court system has been
slow to implement various means of discovery, largely as a result of the
doctrine of parens patriae and the unique nature of the juvenile process.
Although a discernible trend indicates acceptance of pretrial discovery,
there has been considerable experimentation at decisional and statutory
levels to develop procedurally protective discovery mechanisms. Professor
Geraghty traces the use of discovery in juvenile proceedings and devotes
particular attention to whether civil or criminal techniques should serve as
the basis for pretrial discovery. As a corollary to such an examination,
this article isolates the use of depositions and comments on the appropri-
ateness of their inclusion in a model for juvenile discovery.
I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Learned Hand once criticized the criminal procedure sys-
tem as one giving "every advantage" to the accused.' This remark
points out a longstanding controversy regarding the appropriate
scope of discovery in criminal cases. 2 The Supreme Court's deci-
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
1. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
2. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH. U. L. Q. 279; Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case Against Liberal Discov-
ery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963); Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12
STANFORD L. REv. 293 (1960); Goldstein, The State and the Accused. Balance of Ad-
vantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YAL. L. J. 1149 (1960); Sunderland, Scope and
sion in In re Gault,3 which established that juveniles are entitled
to an adversarial-type hearing in the adjudicatory phase of a de-
linquency proceeding, added a new dimension to this already
complex debate.
The initial attempts by the courts and by the legislators to more
precisely define the parameters of discovery in the juvenile proc-
ess were sporadic, and generally succeeded only in adding to the
confusion. Frequently, for example, the type of discovery avail-
able was determined by whether or not a particular jurisdiction
had traditionally attached a civil or criminal label of convenience
to delinquency proceedings.4
In recent years, however, a discernible trend has emerged from
a small but growing body of statutory and case law. This trend is
characterized by an acceptance of pretrial discovery as a useful
tool in the delinquency factfinding process, and by a realization
that criminal discovery rules are generally more appropriate than
rules applicable in civil cases. The one exception to this develop-
ment has been a willingness on the part of state rulemaking au-
thorities 5 to permit the use of depositions in juvenile cases,
something which courts considering the issue have steadfastly re-
fused to do.
This comment will first trace the evolution of the majority posi-
tion regarding juvenile pretrial discovery at both decisional and
statutory levels. Thereafter the discussion will focus on the use of
depositions in the juvenile justice process.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
After Gault, courts inevitably were called upon to address the
question of what role, if any, the Constitution played in determin-
ing the appropriate scope of juvenile discovery. Since adult crimi-
nal defendants have no constitutional right to force wholesale
pretrial disclosure of the prosecution's case,6 it logically follows
that it cannot be a per se denial of due process or equal protection
to refuse discovery rights to juveniles which are constitutionally
unavailable to adults. To date the Supreme Court has given no
indication that special considerations affecting juvenile proceed-
ings require the extension of a greater degree of constitutional
Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L. J. 863 (1933); Developments In the
Law--Discovery, 74 HAIv. L. REV. 940 (1960).
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Villarreal v. State, 495 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
5. The term encompasses both legislatures and courts which have adopted
state or local procedural rules.
6. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958).
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protection than that received by an adult accused.7 A number of
lower courts have expressly rejected such an extension.8
While as a general proposition, neither adults nor juveniles
have a constitutional right to pretrial discovery, there are a
number of decisions which indicate that discovery may be avail-
able by right under certain circumstances. First, Brady v. Mary-
land9 requires the prosecution to disclose evidence which is
favorable to the accused and material to the issues of guilt or sen-
tencing.l0 Indeed, this decision has been further extended to pro-
ceedings where a court has otherwise refused to find any
constitutional basis for a juvenile's right to pretrial discovery."
In Kent v. U.S.,12 the Supreme Court ordered disclosure of so-
cial records on which the juvenile court judge relied in making his
decision to transfer a juvenile's case to the adult criminal division
for trial. While it is not clear whether the decision in Kent rested
on constitutional rather than statutory grounds,13 courts have re-
sponded to it by concluding that counsel for a juvenile should be
permitted to see anything in the court's own file as a matter of
right. Thus, in Baldwin v. Lewis,14 the court reasoned that the
constitutionally mandated right to counsel recognized in Gault is
hollow if a court in a delinquency proceeding rules on the basis of
information which is never identified or made available for in-
spection.
Some courts have held that due process and equal protection
require that juveniles be permitted to inspect, in advance of hear-
ing, discovery items available to adult criminal defendants by
statute or caselaw. Two different analyses have been used to sup-
7. On the contrary, see Fare v. Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 260 (1979), in which the
Court refused to apply different standards for juveniles and adults in deciding
whether or not the minor respondent waived his rights as delineated in Miranda v.
Arizona.
8. In re Hitzeman, 161 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Minn. 1968); In re C., 322 N.Y.S. 2d 203,
66 Misc. 2d 761, (Fam. Ct. N.Y.C. 1971).
9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10. Cf. U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), which substantially limits the scope of
the Brady decision.
11. District of Columbia v. Jackson, 261 A.2d 511 (App. D.C. 1970).
12. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
13. While Kent professes on its face to be a decision following exclusively
from statutory and caselaw, the opinion contains the following language: "We be-
lieve that this result is required by the statute in the context of constitutional
principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel." Id. at 557.
14. Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220, 1232 (E.D. Wisc. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971).
port this position. First, some courts, particularly those in New
York, have concluded that there is certain information intrinsi-
cally necessary to the adequate preparation of any case, and that
due process therefore requires that such information be discover-
able in juvenile as well as adult proceedings. Timely and ade-
quate notice of charges is a prime example of this type of
information.15 Thus, the court in In re L.16 required the state to
respond to respondent's Bill of Particulars where the petition al-
leging delinquency was not sufficiently detailed to comply with
minimum notice requirements.17
In In re Edwin,18 a leading New York case in the area of pretrial
discovery, the court held that whenever "fundamental rights are
affected," due process and fair treatment require that juveniles al-
leged to be delinquent be given the same procedural rights avail-
able to adult defendants under the state's code of criminal
procedure. The respondent in Edwin, therefore, was entitled to
examine, in advance of trial, his own statements, an autopsy re-
port, and other scientific and demonstrative evidence.
In another line of New York cases, fourteenth amendment con-
cepts of fundamental fairness also served as the basis for supply-
ing respondent with the grand jury testimony of two state
witnesses in an adult co-defendant's case where the, state called
the same witnesses in respondent's case.' 9 Moreover, a recent
California case relied on both constitutional and statutory
grounds to strike down a court policy which called for automatic
rejection in juvenile cases of a defense request for reimbursement
for investigative services. In adult cases, such requests were con-
sidered on the merits.20
Language in other opinions implies that irrespective of whether
a specific item of discovery is necessary to meet minimum re-
quirements for a fair trial, equal protection requires that if a state
permits an adult to discover certain information in advance of
trial, that information must also be made available to minors in
delinquency proceedings. For example, in In re Forrest,21 an Illi-
15. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. In re L., 320 N.Y.S. 2d 570, 66 Misc. 2d 142 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.C. 1971).
17. A bill of particulars is not required except where the delinquency petition
is not sufficiently specific to meet due process requirements. In re C. 322 N.Y.S. 2d
203, 66 Misc. 2d 761 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.C. 1971); In re Hitzeman, 161 N.W. 2d 542, 545
(Minn. 1968).
18. In re Edwin, 303 N.Y.S. 2d 406, 60 Misc. 2d 355 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.C. 1969).
19. In re T., 45 App. Div. 2d 660, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 66 (1974); Wolfe v. Berman, 40
App. Div. 2d 869, 337 N.Y.S. 2d 944 (1972); Gold v. Quinones, 37 App. Div. 2d 618, 325
N.Y.S. 2d 294 (1971).
20. Johnny S. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 826, 153 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1979).
21. In re Forrest, 12 Ill. App. 3d 250, 298 N.E.2d 197 (1973).
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nois court concluded that where the state is required to furnish
adult criminal defendants with verbatim statements of state wit-
nesses, "a right sense of justice" demands that the same items be
available to juveniles.22
While some courts have found a constitutional basis for supply-
ing juveniles with pretrial discovery, others have expressly re-
jected this view. In District of Columbia v. Jackson,23 three
respondents charged with rape filed extensive pretrial discovery
motions requesting information that adult criminal defendants
would receive under local law. Refusing to accept respondents'
argument that equal protection requires the same procedural
treatment for juveniles and adults, the Court stated that "there is
sufficient dissimilarity between juvenile proceedings and criminal
proceedings, however, to deny application of the doctrine to this
issue. Criminal trials are comparatively formalistic. But flexible
and informal procedures are essential to the parens patriae func-
tion of the Juvenile Court."24
In In re R.L.,25 a California court also adopted the view that in
the absence of legislation providing a system of discovery for use
in juvenile court, no constitutional provision requires the creation
of such a system.
III. THE EVOLVING CASELAW
The Supreme Court has recognized that, constitutional consid-
erations aside, discovery in both civil and criminal proceedings is
conducive to both the efficient administration of justice, and to
the fairness of the adversary system. 26 This sentiment is shared
by a majority of courts, most of which conclude that some type of
pretrial discovery process is appropriate for the juvenile court
system. 27 Difficulties arise, however, in the attempt to develop a
reasoned model for discovery which must take into account the
special needs and goals of a court system specifically structured
22. Id. at 253, 298 N.E. at 200.
23. District of Columbia v. Jackson, 261 A.2d 511 (App. D.C. 1970).
24. Id. at 512.
25. In re R. L., 3 Cal. App. 3d 100, 104, 83 Cal. Rptr. 81, 85 (1969).
26. See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
27. Joe Z. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26,
91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970); In re R. L., 3 Cal. App. 3d 100, 83 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1969); Pima
County v. Superior Court, 114 Ariz. 400, 561 P.2d 321 (1977).
to deal with problems of the young, especially those accused of
serious criminal behavior.
The approaches taken by the courts fall into three catagories. A
small minority has permitted across the board civil discovery in
delinquency proceedings. Conversely, some courts have limited
pretrial disclosure to information obtainable under rules of crimi-
nal procedure. Finally, a third group of courts has adopted an in-
termediate position, sanctioning a combined use of civil and
criminal discovery techniques.
Texas courts have concluded that because the state legislature
considers delinquency proceedings to be civil in nature, rules of
civil procedure, including discovery, apply.28 Thus, in Villareal v.
State,29 the state was permitted to discover jurisdictional facts
(name, age, address) by serving a Request for Admission on the
minor respondent.
Perhaps significantly, no Texas opinion analyzed in detail the
appropriateness of the application of a broad panoply of civil dis-
covery techniques to the juvenile process. Courts which have di-
rectly considered the consequences of permitting wholesale civil
discovery have rejected the idea for a number of reasons. Some
courts have pointed out that one of the assumed benefits of a sep-
arate juvenile justice system is its ability to adjudicate factual is-
sues expeditiously and informally, a benefit which they see as
undercut by allowing extensive civil discovery. 30 Other courts
have concluded that if they were to permit civil discovery, they in-
evitably would be placed in the untenable position of encroaching
on the fifth amendment right of juveniles to avoid self-incrimina-
tion,3 1 or of unfairly limiting the opportunity for pretrial discovery
to one party, the respondent. 32
Other concerns about the negative effect of civil discovery on
the fairness of the adjudication process have been voiced. In Han-
rahan v. Felt,33 the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that while
juvenile proceedings are essentially civil in nature, the potentially
serious consequences faced by delinquents give rise to the same
concerns which have led courts to reject broad discovery in adult
criminal proceedings. Specifically, the Court in Hanrahan ex-
pressed the concern that extensive discovery could lead to har-
28. See, e.g., Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612 (Texas 1972).
29. 495 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
30. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 307, 486 P.2d 1201, 1211, 96 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1969);
Joe Z. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1970); District of Columbia v. Jackson, 261 A. 2d 511 (App. D.C. 1970); In
re Edwin, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409, 60 Misc. 2d 355, 358 (Fam. Ct. N.Y.C. 1969).
31. In re R. L., 3 Cal. App. 3d 100, 83 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1969).
32. In re W., 309 N.Y.S.2d 280, 283, 62 Misc. 2d 585, 588 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.S. 1970).
33. 48 Ill. 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
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rassment and intimidation of witnesses, suppression of evidence
and an increase in perjury.3 4
In In re Edwin,35 a New York court refused a minor's request to
employ traditional civil discovery techniques, such as interrogato-
ries and depositions. The decision was based upon the determi-
nation that most delinquency petitions in New York are fied by
citizens, most of whom would be reluctant to complain about al-
legedly criminal behavior if required to answer time-consuming
pretrial discovery requests. The court also noted that counsel ap-
pointed to represent juveniles would face additional burdens if
they were obligated to prepare elaborate pre-adjudicatory discov-
ery motions.
It is evident, therefore, that while most courts have flatly re-
jected the notion of a blanket application of civil discovery rules
in delinquency cases, they have not adopted a uniform position
regarding what system of rules should apply. In Hanrahan v.
Felt,3 6 the court held that while a general application of civil dis-
covery rules was inappropriate, the unique nature of a delin-
quency proceeding seemed to indicate that such cases were
nonetheless more like civil than criminal actions:
Delinquency hearings are not in the nature of a criminal trial but consti-
tute merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation
and rehabilitation of the minor child. Their purpose is not penal but pro-
tective, aimed to check juvenile delinquency and to throw around the
child, just starting, perhaps on an evil course and deprived of proper pa-
rental care, the strong arm of the state acting as parens patriae.
3 7
In an effort to reconcile the essentially civil nature of juvenile
proceedings with the concern that the serious consequences of a
delinquency finding might result in a subversion of justice, the
Hanrahan court adopted the position that a juvenile court may,
in its discretion, allow discovery on a case-by-case basis, includ-
ing broader discovery than would be permitted in an adult crimi-
nal proceeding.38
California courts also have vested their juvenile judges with
discretionary powers to permit discovery proceedings in delin-
quency cases, but that discretion is limited to criminal discovery
devices. In a case of first impression, Joe Z. v. Superior Court of
34. Id. at 172-73, 269 N.E.2d at 2-4.
35. 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 60 Misc. 2d 355 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.S. 1969).
36. 48 Ill. 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
37. Id. at 173, 269 N.E.2d at 3 (quoting from In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603-04,
109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954)).
38. Id. at 173, 269 N.E.2d at 3.
Los Angeles County,3 9 the court reasoned that even in the ab-
sence of any constitutional right or statutory directive, the author-
ity of a court to order discovery in a juvenile proceeding is
inherent in the "power of every court to develop rules of proce-
dure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal justice
and promoting the orderly ascertainment of truth."40
At issue in Joe Z. was whether a minor charged with murder
could discover his own statements and those of his co-defendants.
The Court did not assume that procedural safeguards available to
adult criminal defendants are automatically applicable in juvenile
proceedings. Rather, the Court looked to cases dealing with dis-
covery of statements in criminal proceedings to determine if the
reasoning supporting the adult's right to discovery was equally
appropriate in juvenile cases. Citing the important role that state-
ments play in the search for truth and the special caution to be
used by courts when considering juvenile confessions,4 1 the Court
concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the minor ac-
cess to the desired information.
Later California cases indicate that this careful weighing of
needs has given way to a somewhat automatic transference to ju-
venile proceedings of any judicially-created right to discovery
which an adult criminal defendant possesses. Thus, in Dell M. v.
Superior Court,42 the court in a footnote cited Joe Z. as standing
for the proposition that "[t]he standards applicable to criminal
discovery apply also to juvenile delinquency proceedings." 4 3 On
this basis the court upheld the right of minors accused of re-
sistingarrest to examine police personnel files to determine if the
arresting officers had in the past been the objects of excessive
force complaints.
Similarly, in In re Ricky B.,44 the juvenile court erred in deny-
ing a minor access to an accomplice's juvenile record when the
accomplice testified against respondent in a delinquency proceed-
ing. The reviewing court again merely cited the availability of this
type of information in an adult criminal case as the basis for its
ruling.
39. 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970).
40. Id. at 802-03, 478 P.2d at 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
41. See, e.g., In re Gault, in which the Supreme Court, citing its own prior deci-
sions and Dean Wigmore, concluded that a minor respondent has a right to be free
of self-incrimination at a delinquency hearing in part because "[i]t has long been
recognized that the eliciting and use of confessions or admissions requires careful
scrutiny," and "[tihis Court has emphasized that admissions and confessions of
juveniles require special caution." 383 U.S. at 44-45 (citations omitted).
42. 70 Cal. App. 3d 782, 144 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977).
43. Id. at 783 n. 1, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 419 n.1.
44. 82 Cal. App. 3d 106, 146 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1978).
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Following the trend in California, courts in other jurisdictions
have also decided juvenile pretrial discovery issues on the operat-
ing principle that criminal procedural rules are appropriately
transferable to the adjudication of delinquency petitions. In In re
Cowell,45 a Pennsylvania court assumed juveniles are entitled to
invoke the statutory provisions governing adult criminal discov-
ery, but ruled that the respondent had not met his burden of
showing a need for discovery as required by those rules. In In re
Pima County v. Superior Court,4 6 an Arizona court ordered a mi-
nor to furnish the State with the names and addresses of alibi
witnesses, rejecting respondent's argument that the special na-
ture of a juvenile proceeding should protect the minor against
that type of disclosure.
In holding that the same rule applicable in adult cases is also
appropriate in juvenile proceedings, the court reasoned:
While in a game of chess one may slyly fianchetto his bishop and later un-
cover it for a surprise attack, the trial of a cause in our courts is not "un
grand jeu" (a big game) to be won by the litigant most successful in the
act of surprise .... The juvenile court here was exercising its inherent
power predicated on the requirements for the due administration of jus-
tice. (citations omitted). 4 7
New York courts have produced the largest body of juvenile de-
linquency pretrial discovery opinions and, in New York cases the
trend toward routine application of criminal discovery rules to de-
linquency proceedings is most apparent.
Since 1962, New York's Family Court Act has included a provi-
sion that civil practice law and rules "shall apply to the extent
that they are appropriate to the proceedings involved."48 Thus,
the task faced by New York courts in ruling on delinquency dis-
covery issues has been to decide whether the specific discovery
device sought to be used is "suitable" to the juvenile adjudicatory
process.
The first New York case to address that issue, In re Edwin,49
concluded that the standard civil discovery devices of written in-
terrogatories, oral deposition and requests to admit are not appro-
priate for use in delinquency proceedings. The court stressed,
however, that the statutory language of section 165 indicated a
45. In re Cowell, 364 A.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1976).
46. 114 Ariz. 400, 561 P.2d 321 (1977).
47. Id. at 401, 561 P.2d at 322.
48. N.Y. Jur. Law (McKinney), Family Court Act, § 165 (1962).
49. 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408, 60 Misc. 2d 355, 358 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.C. 1969).
legislative intent that certain procedural rights, including discov-
ery, should be available to minors accused of crimes. The court
therefore permitted respondent to discover the contents of writ-
ten witness statements, although that same information clearly
was unavailable to adult criminal defendants.50
For several years following Edwin, courts either wholly rejected
the idea that civil discovery methods are ever "suitable" in delin-
quency proceedings,51 or reasoned that the way to decide if a pro-
vision of the civil practice code is applicable in juvenile cases is to
look for an equivalent provision in the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. In In re L.,52 for example, the court allowed a minor to file a
Bill of Particulars in part because adult criminal defendants were
permitted to do so by statute.
In a 1977 case, In re Archer,5 3 the New York Supreme Court
noted an increasing trend by New York courts to apply criminal
rather than civil procedure rules in delinquency cases. In In re
Terry T.,54 the court formally adopted a position that, despite the
language of section 165, criminal discovery rules are to be fol-
lowed whenever minors are accused of acts which constitute
crimes if committed by adults. In so holding, the court explained:
We have been granting discovery under the CPLR (Civil Practice Laws
and Rules) in an effort not to prejudice the Respondent by denying him
his right to disclosure. However, this court is of the opinion that the
proper form in these proceedings for pre-trial discovery is to proceed pur-
suant to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), and it is the direction of the
Court that pre-trial discovery in delinquency proceedings shall follow the
rules set forth in the CPL.55
As the basis for this decision, the court noted the quasi-criminal
nature of delinquency proceedings and its belief that civil discov-
ery procedures are simply too cumbersome and time-consuming
for use in juvenile cases.
IV. STATUTES AND COURT RULES
As the prior discussion indicates, in the decade following the
Kent and Gault decisions courts hesitatingly took the initiative in
delineating pretrial discovery procedures for use in juvenile court
proceedings. The development of statutory law in the area has
proceeded at an even slower pace. Until recently, few jurisdic-
tions made any effort to systematize the rights and responsibili-
50. Id. at 409, 60 Misc. 2d at 359, (citing, e.g., People v. Graziano, 261 N.Y.S.2d
546, 46 Misc. 2d 936 (1965)).
51. See, e.g., In re P., 303 N.Y.S.2d 827, 60 Misc. 2d 697 (1969).
52. 320 N.Y.S.2d 570, 66 Misc. 2d 142 (Fam. Ct. N.Y.C. 1971).
53. 392 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364, 89 Misc. 2d 526, 528 (1977).
54. 397 N.Y.S.2d 548, 90 Misc. 2d 1015 (1977).
55. Id. at 549, 90 Misc. 2d at 1015.
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ties of juveniles seeking discovery. Those that did enact statutes
concentrated on a codification of the principle established in Kent
that a juvenile is denied fundamental fairness if a judge makes a
critical decision based on information unavailable to the juvenile
and his attorney. Thus, several states have enacted legislation
which permits juvenile respondents access to records possessed
by the court, law enforcement, or other social agencies. 56 Even
these narrow provisions vary with respect to the procedures to be
followed in securing access. Some make inspection a matter of
right,5 while others permit disclosure only in the court's discre-
tion.58
Recently, however, there has been a modest increase in the
number of statutes and court rules focusing on juvenile
preadjudication discovery procedures. These legislative guide-
lines range in specificity from conclusory statements that rules of
criminal discovery apply,59 to extensive provisions paralleling
56. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-235 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-124 (Supp.
1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3502 (Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.147 (West
Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 3308 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119 § 60A (Supp. 1979); MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 712 A.4(6) (Supp. 1979); MINN.
STAT. § 260.161(2)(1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.22 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4:65, (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.275(b) (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-
51 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1111 (West Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419.56(2),(3) (Supp. 1977); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6307 (Purdon Supp. 1979); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 14-1-64 (Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-33 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-251 (1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.14 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-55 (1977); VA. CODE § 16.1-274 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.04.272(4) (Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-239 (1977) (parties to action and
officers of court only); MINN. R. Juv. CT. 10-5, 11-2 (1979); MO. R. Juv. CT. 119.05e
(1979).
57. Such provisions usually allow only court personnel, parties, parents or
guardians and legal representatives of parties to inspect records. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-124 (Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 3308(3)(Supp.
1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 60A (Supp. 1979); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.4(6) (Supp. 1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:22 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4-65 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-51 (1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 419-567
(1977); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6307 (Purdon Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-64
(Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-33 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-251
(1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.14 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-55
(1977); VA. CODE § 16.1-274 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.272(4)
(Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-239 (1977) (parties to action and officers of
court only); ARIz. R. Juv. CT. 9(a) (1973).
58. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3502 (Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
206.04(2) (1978); DEL. FAM. CT. R. 150 (1978).
59. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §31-6-7-9(a)(Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 208.060(2) (b)(Supp. 1978); LA. CODE Juv. PRoc. ANN. art. 59 (1979); but see ALA.
R. Juv. PRoc. 1 (ALA. R. Cry. PRoc. applies to all matters in the juvenile court),
and DEL. FAM. CT. R. 150 (1978) ('where all parties to a proceeding are repre-
those adopted for use in adult criminal proceedings. 60
Following the trend noted in judicial opinions on the subject,
the majority of legislative provisions rest on the assumption that
regardless of whether a juvenile proceeding is dubbed civil, crimi-
nal or quasi-criminal, discovery needs in a delinquency case are
more closely akin to those in adult criminal rather than civil
cases. As a consequence, a core of information obtainable by re-
spondents in recently-enacted legislation usually includes the
names and addresses of prosecution witnesses, 61 together with
their statements, 62 the statements or admissions of respondent 63
and his/her corespondents, 64 and documentary 65 and scientific 66
evidence. Additionally, more detailed statutory schemes cite the
availability of grand jury minutes, 67 Brady information, 68 and po-
lice records of prosecution witnesses.69
Most jurisdictions with detailed pretrial discovery rules permit
sented by counsel of record, any party may conduct discovery in accordance with
the Rules of Civil Procedure for the Superior Court of the State of Delaware,
60. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.293 (1979); CAL. Juv. CT. R. 1341 (1979); COLO.
R. Juv. P. 9 (1976); DEL. FAM. CT. R. 150 (1978); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070 (1979); MD. R.
P. 909 (1977); N.M.R.P. FOR CHILDREN'S COURT 30-38 (1978); 1979 N.C. ADV. LEGIS.
SERV. § 7A-562-565; OHio R. Juv. P. 24 (1979).
61. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48-293 (1979); CAL. JuV. CT. R. 1341(d)(4)(1979);
COLO. R. Juv. P. 9(a) (1) (I) (1976); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a) (1) (i) (1979); MD. R. P. 909
§ a(3)(d), (f)(1977); N.M. R. P. 30(b) (1978); 1979 N.C. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. § 7A-562
(2); OHIO R. Juv. P. 24(a)(1) (1979).
62. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48-298 (1979); CAL. Juv. CT. R. 1341(d)(5)(1979);
COLO. R. Juv. P. 9(a)
(1) (I) (1976); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a) (1) (ii) (1979); MD. R. P. 909 § a(3) (d),(f) (1977);
N.M. R. P. 30(b) (1978); OHIO R. Juv. P. 24(a)(1) (1979).
63. See, e.g., CAL. Juv. CT. R. 1341(d)(2)(1979); COLO. R. Juv. P. 9(a)(1)
(II) (1976); D.C. R. Juv. P. 16(a) (1978); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a) (o) (iii)(1979); MD. R.
P. 909, § a(3) (1977); N.M. R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S COURT 30(a)(1) (1978); 1979 N.C.
ADv. LEGIS. SERv. § 7A-562(1)(b); OHIO R. JuV. P. 24(A)(2)(1979).
64. See, e.g., CAL. Juv. CT. R. 1341(d)(3)(1979); COLO. R. Juv. P. 9(a)(1)
(II)(1976); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a)(1)(iv)(1979); MD. R. P. 909 § a(3)(e)(1977); N.M.
R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S COURT 30(a)(1)(1978); 1979 N.C. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. § 7A-
562(1) (b).
65. See, e.g., CAL. JUV. CT. R. 1341(d) (1979); COLO. R. Juv. P. 9(a)(1)(V)
(1976); D.C. R. Juv. PROC. 16(b) (1978); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a)(1)(vi), (ix), (xi)
(1979); MD. R. P. 909 § a(3)(g) (1977); N.M. R. P. 30(a)(3) (1978); 1979 N.C. ADv.
LEGISL SERV. § 7A-562(3); OHIO R. Juv. P. 24(A) (5) (1979).
66. See, e.g., CAL. JUV. CT. R. 1341(d)(6) (1979); COLO. R. Juv. P.
9(a) (1)(iv) (1976); D.C. R. Juv. P. 16(a) (1978); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a) (1) (x) (1979);
MD. R. P. 909 § a(3)(f) (1977); N.M. R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S COURT 30(a)(4)(1978);
OHIO R. Juv. P. 24(A)(4) (1979).
67. See, e.g., CoLo. R. Juv. P. 9(a)(1)(III) and (a)(I) (1976); FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.070(a) (1) (v) (1979).
68. See, e.g., CAL. Juv. CT. R. 1341(c) (1979); COLO. R. Juv. P. 9(a)(3) (1976);
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a)(2) (1979); MD. R. P. 909 § a(3) (a) (1977).
69. See, e.g., CAL. Juv. CT. P. 1341(d)(8)(1977); N.M. R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S
COURT 30(b) (1978).
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some form of reciprocal discovery.70 Characteristically, respon-
dents are placed under an affirmative duty to disclose to the pros-
ecution physical7 1 and documentary72 evidence, notice of
defenses, 73 and a list of defense witnesses 74 and their state-
ments.75
Finally, many statutes or rules cloak courts with discretionary
authority to grant discovery in addition to information which may
be obtained as a matter of right.76
These discovery provisions closely track provisions specifically
designed and adopted to serve the needs of the defense and pros-
ecution in adult criminal trials.77 The one exception to this pat-
tern, however, has been an unprecedented willingness on the part
of rulemakers to permit the use of oral depositions in the juvenile
adjudicatory process. 78 This development is decidedly contrary to
the majority position adopted in connection with adult criminal
proceedings. 79 In addition, it is at variance with the view taken by
courts faced squarely with the issue of whether to allow deposi-
tions in delinquency cases. 0
70. See, e.g., COLO. R. Juv. P. 9 Part IH (1976); D.C. R. Juv. P. 16(c)(1978); FLA.
R. Juv. P. 8.070(a) (6) (1979); MD. R. P. 909 § a(6) (1977); N.M. R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S
COURT 31 (1978); 1979 N.C. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. § 7A-563. See also, OHIO R. Juv. P. 24
(1979).
71. See, e.g., D.C. R. Juv. P. 16(c) (1978); FLA. R. JUv. P. 8.070(a) (6) (iii) (1979);
1979 N.C. ADv. LEGIS. SERV. § 7A-563(2),(4).
72. See, e.g., COLO. R. Juv. P. 9 Part II (a) (2) (1976); D.C. R. Juv. P. 16(c) (1978);
MD. R. P. 909 § a(6)(j) (1977); N.M. R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S COURT 31(a) (1),(2) (1978);
1979 N.C. ADv. LEGIS. SERv. § 7A-563(2).
73. See, e.g., COLO. R. Juv. P. 9 Part H(a) (3) (1976); N.M. R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S
COURT 38 (alibi), 39 (insanity) (1978).
74. See, e.g., COLO. R. Juv. P. 9 Part HI(a)(3) (1976); MD. R. P. 909 § a(6)(k)
(1977); N.M. R. P. FOR CHILDREN'S COURT 31(b) (1978); 1979 N.C. ADV. LEGIS. SERv.
§ 7A-563(1).
75. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.070(a) (6) (i), (ii)(1979); but cfI. N.M. R. P. FOR CHIL-
DREN'S COURT 31(c) (2) (1978) (statements made by witnesses to respondent, his
agents or attorneys, not subject to disclosure).
76. See, e.g., COLO. R. Juv. P. 9 Part I (d)(1976); 1979 N.C. Anv. LEGIS. SERV.
§§ 7A-562(4), 7A-563(3).
77. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Drafts, 1970 & 1978). UNIFORM RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 421, (Approved Draft 1974); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
78. DE. FAM. CT. R. 150 (1975); N.M. R. Juv. P. FOR CHILDREN'S COURT 34-37
(1978); OHIO R. JUv. P. 25 (1979).
79. A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PRO-
CEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Drafts 1970 & 1978); but cf. UNIFORM RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 431 (Approved Draft 1974).
80. In re Giangrosso, 367 So. 2d 376 (La. 1979); Joe Z. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970); In re R. L., 31
Two questions arise as a result of this deviation from the gen-
eral trend toward the use of criminal discovery techniques. First,
how does one explain the divergence of opinion evident in statu-
tory and caselaw regarding the appropriateness of deposition use
in juvenile proceedings? Secondly, which of the two positions is
to be preferred on the merits?
The readiness of rulemakers to permit depositions in delin-
quency cases is probably grounded in the traditional belief that a
separate court system for juveniles requires that cases involving
minors be regarded as more than "mini-criminal trials."81 Fur-
thermore, rulemakers recently confronted with the task of draft-
ing juvenile pretrial discovery rules have had the benefit of
scholarly comment and model code legislation calling for use of
depositions in delinquency proceedings.
Specifically, the Institute of Judicial Administration-American
Bar Association Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards
(1977)82 recommended that states adopt juvenile discovery rules
essentially identical to the extensive standards adopted by the
ABA for use in connection with adult criminal prosecutions, but
with an additional provision permitting discovery by deposition. 83
Significantly, the commentary accompanying this recommenda-
tion focuses on the committee's disagreement with the majority
position which prohibits the use of depositions in adult criminal
cases rather than concentrating on the pros and cons of deposi-
tion use in the juvenile justice system.84
Rulemakers might also have been influenced by commentary
sanctioning the use of civil discovery techniques in delinquency
proceedings. In one particularly compelling article85 the author's
central theme was that the reasons advanced in the caselaw for
rejecting civil discovery are unconvincing and can be met by
slightly modifying standard rules currently used in adult civil
cases. Thus, worries expressed by courts over delays caused by
extensive civil discovery can be alleviated merely by imposing
strict time limits on the information-gathering phase of the adju-
dicatory process. Likewise, fear of perjury, intimidation and the
Cal. App. 3d 100, 83 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1969); In re P., 303 N.Y.S.2d 827, 60 Misc. 2d 697
(1969); but cf., Hanrahan v. Ill., 48 Ill. 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1, (1971); W.B. & D.B. V.
State, 343 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1977).
81. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
82. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT
PROCEEDINGS § 3 (1977).
83. Id. at §§ 3.3 to 3.12 (depositions).
84. Id. (commentary accompanying § 3.3(B)).
85. Gray, Toward A Code of Discovery for Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings,
50 IND. L.J. 808 (1975).
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suppression of evidence can be dealt with through the use of pro-
tective orders.
As persuasive as this reasoning is, it fails to include an analysis
of the needs of the respective interests represented in a delin-
quency proceeding and a discussion of the discovery model best
suited to serve those needs. Rather, it, like the ABA model code
legislation discussed above, is bottomed on an assumption that
any position which curbs an adult's pretrial access to information
is incorrect and, therefore, anything short of full civil discovery in
juvenile cases must also be wrong.
It is the position taken by this comment that courts and
rulemaking bodies which have permitted extensive criminal-type
discovery, but have prohibited the automatic use of depositions
and other civil discovery techniques, have taken the most func-
tional and therefore most desirable stance on the issue of the ap-
propriate scope of juvenile pretrial discovery.
V. THE USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN DELINQUENCY CASES
Any discussion of the appropriate model for pre-adjudication
discovery in delinquency proceedings must begin with a review of
the benefits advanced in support of a separate system of justice
for children accused of criminal conduct. A compendium of these
advantages can be compiled from a collective reading of the re-
cent line of Supreme Court cases focusing on the constitutional
contours of the juvenile justice system. Thus, in In re Gault,86 the
Court noted approvingly the system's dual objectives of avoiding
classification of juveniles as criminals and preventing their adju-
dication as delinquents from operating to their disadvantage in
adulthood.87 In In re Winship,88 the Court stressed the impor-
tance of "informality, flexibility, or speed" in the fact finding proc-
ess,89 while in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,90 the Court cited among
the system's primary benefits its "discretionary intake procedure
permitting disposition short of adjudication, and its flexible sen-
tencing permitting emphasis on rehabilitation."91
The desirability of these objectives has remained constant since
86. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
87. Id. at 24-25.
88. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
89. Id. at 366.
90. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
91. Id. at 542.
911
the beginning of the juvenile court system. Views on how best to
achieve these goals, however, have fluctuated. In what has been
referred to as the era of the "socialized juvenile court,"92 it was
felt that any concentration on legal rights or procedures inevita-
bly would act as a hinderance to the solicitious remolding of way-
ward children. 93
Throughout the period from 1899 to 1967, critics of the socialized
model of juvenile justice increasingly expressed concern that
juveniles accused of criminal conduct and subject to lengthy peri-
ods of involuntary confinement were being asked to relinquish
procedural protections in exchange for benefits that existed more
in theory than in fact. Finally, after decades of silence on the fun-
damental questions of the validity of a separate judicial system
for minors and procedures used in such a system, the Supreme
Court in 1967 took up the banner of those who had long argued
that some degree of procedural regularity in juvenile proceedings
is required by the Federal Constitution. In the space of eight
years, the Supreme Court changed the operating complexion of
the adjudicatory phase of delinquency proceedings by recognizing
a constitutional right to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation
and cross-examination, the right to invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination,94 to have the state prove its case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt 95 and to be free of double jeopardy concerns. 96
But while the Supreme Court has recognized that certain fun-
damental procedural rights possessed by adult criminal defend-
ants are required in the fact finding phase of a delinquency
proceeding, it has refused to sanction the wholesale transfer of
criminal procedures for fear that "if the formalities of the criminal
adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile
court system, there is little need for its separate existence."97
The Court's opinion in McKeiver makes it clear that, hence-
forth, the question of whether a certain procedural protection
should be afforded, at least as a matter of constitutional right,
must be decided on an issue-by-issue basis. In so deciding, the
appropriate analytical approach is to balance the need for the par-
ticular procedural device against its power to disrupt the unique
nature of the juvenile court system. 98
92. FAUST AND BRANTINGHAM,:JUVENILE JUSTICE Pii.AwsoPHY 145 (1974).
93. See, Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909); Van Waters,
The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure, 13 J. AM. JUST. OF CRIM. L. & CRM!-
NOLoGY 61 (1922).
94. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
95. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
96. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
97. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
98. Id. at 545, 580.
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It is interesting to speculate on the possible outcome of such a
balancing with regard to the issue of pretrial discovery in juvenile
cases. What function does discovery serve and how essential is
this function to resolution of the issue of whether or not a minor
committed an act which would constitute a crime if done by an
adult?
Pretrial discovery is a tool fashioned to aid in the ascertainment
of truth, a quest which serves the basic purpose of any system of
justice-the orderly and rapid resolution of disputes. Discovery
accomplishes this goal by promoting the complete exposure of all
relevant facts, which in turn narrows and sharpens issues for liti-
gation, which in turn eliminates both surplusage and surprise, ex-
pediting ultimate resolution of the core dispute.
In both the civil and criminal areas, the development of pretrial
discovery mechanisms has followed as a corollary to a relaxation
of procedural rules regarding the specificity of complaints initiat-
ing the legal process.99 This development came first and remains
most pronounced in the civil sphere.10 0 The discrepancy in
growth can be explained by an examination of the most funda-
mental dissimilarities in the civil and criminal justice systems.
As a general matter, a civil dispute involves a conflict between
two private parties; a criminal prosecution, however, finds the
state pitted against an individual accused. This distinction plays
a significant role in deciding the appropriateness of a complete
exchange of all information possessed by the litigants before trial.
First, because the awesome power of the state is involved, the
accused has, under our constitutional system, a series of rights
designed to ensure as high a degree of procedural fairness as pos-
sible. As part of this procedural armour, a criminal defendant has
a right not to incriminate himself and a right to the speediest pos-
sible adjudication on the issue of his guilt or innocence. The
existence of these constitutional rights has been used to support
the argument that liberal pretrial discovery is less suitable in
criminal than in civil cases. Experience has shown that extensive
discovery can be a time-consuming process, something which in-
herently conflicts with the defendant's sixth amendment right to
a speedy trial. Additionally, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion means that the prosecution will not be entitled to full discov-
99. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-80 (1960).
100. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 81 (1970).
ery of the defendant's case. That fact has in the past led courts to
conclude that since unilateral discovery is unfair to the prosecu-
tion, its use by either side should be prohibited. 10 1
Although significant inroads have been made into the argument
that criminal discovery is a "one-way street,"102 the fact remains
that the state cannot force a criminal defendant to testify against
himself. This necessarily means that the complete exchange of
information before trial is of significantly more value, in terms of
efficient resolution, in civil cases. For example, discovery in civil
cases affirmatively contributes to the settlement of cases before
trial. It exposes groundless or fraudulent claims which can be
dealt with by means of summary judgment rather than full-blown
proceedings. It reveals weaknesses in a litigant's case, thus pro-
moting the desirability of an early resolution. It provides a
clearer factual basis for determining the amount of settlement.
The criminal defendant's right to remain silent mitigates against
the availability of this type of resolution-inducing information.
In addition to the distinction between the identities of the liti-
gants in civil and criminal cases, the relative difference in stakes
faced by those litigants has also contributed to the differing
growth rate regarding the use of discovery. Loss of liberty, even
life, is faced by a criminal accused. This in turn has led to a fear
that, if the state were forced to disclose information to the defend-
ant, it could lead to intimidation of potential prosecution wit-
nesses and to fabrication of evidence in order to defeat the state's
case.10 3 That possibility has meant that where discovery has been
allowed in criminal cases, it has been allowed only under strict
court supervision. This is in sharp contrast to the efficient self-op-
erating discovery procedures adopted for use in civil matters. 0 4
While these are factors which contributed to the restrictive role
of pretrial discovery in criminal proceedings in the past, it is now
clear that the pendulum has swung in favor of those advocating
101. See, e.g., In re W., 309 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284, 62 Misc. 2d 585, 588 (Fam. Ct. 1970).
See also, A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, § 1.2 (Approved Draft 1970).
102. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), in which the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute requiring a criminal defendant
to disclose the name and address of an intended alibi witness.
103. "In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often
discovery will lead not to honest factftnding, but on the contrary to perjury and the
suppression of evidence." State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
104. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 requiring the defense and prosecution to
move the court to discover ascertainable information but FED. R. Crv. P. 30 permits
the parties, as a general rule, to arrange for the deposition of any person, including
a party, without leave of court.
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permissive criminal discovery.l0 5 This is so because of an increas-
ing conviction that discovery is a significant aid in securing just
and efficient fact finding in criminal cases, and because of the ex-
perience of states which experimented with broad discovery.
Those states demonstrated that the problems feared from liberal-
ized discovery were in large measure illusory.106
Much of the history of juvenile law has been an adoption of
trends already established in adult criminal proceedings.107 It is
therefore neither surprising nor inappropriate that the movement
in juvenile law has been to permit increasingly expansive crimi-
nal-type discovery in the adjudicatory phase of the delinquency
process. As a body, the Supreme Court's opinions from Gault
through Fare v. Michael C., 108 recognize the de facto criminal na-
ture of delinquency proceedings. The fact that children were be-
ing accused of criminal conduct, when combined with the not
insignificant loss of liberty in jail-like settings, led the Court to
conclude that due process required that procedural protections
designed to assure accurate fact finding on the issue of an adult's
guilt or innocence be similarly available to minors accused of
crimes.109
As with adults, the effective exercise of a juvenile's constitu-
tional rights to counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination, is
dependent on an adequate opportunity to prepare for confronta-
tion of adverse witnesses. This includes obtaining information as
to their identity, what they have said about the alleged crime,
what documentary evidence will be used to support their testi-
mony, the results of physical, mental and scientific tests to be tes-
105. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STANFORD L. REV.
293 (1960).
106. Commentary, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, § 1.2 (Draft, 1969).
107. For example, the Supreme Court's recognition in Gault that a state delin-
quency respondent has a privilege against self-incrimination followed the Court's
1964 ruling in MaUoy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the fifth amendment privilege
extends to state criminal defendants by virtue of the fourteenth amendment.
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 365 (1970); McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Fare v.
Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
109. McKeiver is the only case to date in which the Supreme Court expressly
refused to find that a juvenile is entitled to a procedural right given to an accused
adult by the Constitution. In McKeitYer, the Court concluded that a minor respon-
dent is not entitled to a trial by jury because a jury trial is not an integral part of
the fact finding process. 403 U.S. at 543.
tified to by witnesses and what the respondent and his
accomplices have told others about their alleged participation in
the crime. This is the same type of information which a respon-
dent is entitled to discover in jurisdictions where broad criminal
rules have been adopted for use in delinquency proceedings.110
Permitting discovery of this nature is consistent with the test
enunciated in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania for deciding whether or
not procedural devices used in adult criminal cases should be em-
ployed in delinquency proceedings. Liberal bilateral discovery of
the type originally proposed by the American Bar Association
Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,"' and now adopted for
use in a majority of jurisdictions,1 2 "insures that the juvenile
court will operate in an atmosphere which is orderly enough to
impress the juvenile with the gravity of the situation and the im-
partiality of the tribunal and at the same time informal enough to
permit the benefits of the juvenile system to operate."l13
Specifically, criminal-type discovery contributes to orderly and
principled decision-making in juvenile cases by providing ade-
quate information for informed intake screening, diversion, and
pleas, by expediting trials, minimizing surprise, and affording an
opportunity for effective cross-examination.1 14 In addition, al-
lowing indigent respondents to discover information in the pos-
session of the state would correct the imbalance of investigative
resources available to the respective sides.
On the other hand, permitting discovery of the type of informa-
tion catalogued would not significantly undercut the benefits of a
separate juvenile justice system. Adoption of a substantially self-
operating discovery system which basically involves only the ex-
change of already-acquired information would not unduly
lengthen the period between the time a minor is taken into cus-
tody and the adjudicatory hearing." 5 The dispositional phase of
110. See notes 66-80 supra.
111. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PRO-
CEDURE BEFORE TRIAL (Approved Draft 1970).
112. Id. at ch. 11.
113. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 529, 539 (1971) (quoting the lower court
opinion).
114. These are the articulated purposes for discovery as incorporated in IJA-
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL
COURT PROCEEDINGS § 3.1 (Draft, 1977).
115. Most states have a statutory provision requiring the speedy adjudication of
delinquency petitions. In Illinois, for example, in the case of a respondent not in
detention, an adjudicatory hearing must be set within 30 days. If detained, the mi-
nor has a statutory right to an adjudicatory hearing within 10 days of the order of
the court directing detention. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-2 (1976). Any viable sys-
tem of discovery must take into account these statutory time limitations.
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the process, the touchstone of the juvenile justice system,116
would be unaffected. Fears of misuse of discovered information
can be dealt with by protective orders and by the contempt pow-
ers of the court.
These are the types of considerations which have led an in-
creasing number of courts and legislatures to sanction the use of
criminal discovery techniques in delinquency proceedings. As
previously noted, however, there has been a greater tendency to
permit the use of discovery depositions in juvenile cases than in
adult criminal cases. Such a trend carries with it the danger of
upsetting the balance sought to be struck between the desirability
of procedural regularity and the efficient functioning of the juve-
nile court system.
Oral depositions undoubtedly serve as useful tools for eliciting
facts and legal theories from opponents. In addition, they provide
tactical advantages for those who employ them. An adverse wit-
ness's testimony is frozen, thereby permitting impeachment if the
witness changes his or her story at trial. Questioning of a witness
before trial can uncover relevant information which might not
have otherwise been revealed. Discovery of facts on which one's
opponent relies is helpful in framing one's own response to the is-
sues. Of course, the availability of depositions also has negative
tactical aspects. For example, in a civil case, one's own witnesses,
including the principal party, can be impeached if their deposition
testimony varies from their trial testimony. Or, taking an adverse
witness's deposition can backfire by effectively educating the wit-
ness in testimentary techniques.
These uses of the advantages and disadvantages of deposition
use in civil cases admittedly have equal application in both crimi-
nal and juvenile proceedings. There are, however, drawbacks to
permitting depositions in juvenile cases which are not present in
civil matters. These drawbacks relate to 1) the time-consuming
nature of depositions; 2) their cost; and 3) the increased liklihood
that witnesses will not voluntarily come forward in juvenile cases.
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the is-
sue, state courts have held that juveniles, like adult criminal de-
fendants, have a constitutional right to a speedy trial. 1 7
116. P. PIERSMA, LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES 345-47 (3rd ed. 1977).
117. See, e.g., Piland v. Clark County Juvenile Court Services, 85 Nev. 489, 457
P.2d 523 (1969); State v. Henry, 78 N.M. 579, 434 P.2d 692 (1967).
Legislative enactments also have stressed the need for a rapid de-
termination of the question of whether or not a respondent is, in
fact, delinquent. 118 The time factor has been a crucial element
which courts have considered in deciding whether or not to per-
mit any pre-adjudication procedures.119 This concern with
prompt determination is based on an accepted notion that chil-
dren do not react to the passage of time in the same way that
adults do.
In Beyond The Best Interests of The Child,120 authors Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit detail the concept that "unlike adults, who have
learned to anticipate the future and thus to manage delay, chil-
dren have a built-in time sense based on the urgency of their in-
stinctual and emotional needs."121 As a consequence, delay in
adjudication proceedings can create anxiety beyond that exper-
ienced by an adult charged with the commission of an offense. 122
Additionally, the psychological impact of a swift reaction by an
authority figure immediately following a child's unacceptable be-
havior is lost by undue postponement.
The respondent is not the only interested party harmed by de-
lay in delinquency proceedings. Increasingly, legislatures and
courts have pointed out that one of the aims of the juvenile jus-
tice system is to protect the best interests of the community. The
public, as well as the minor, has a stake in speedy adjudication of
delinquency cases. 123
While there is no doubt that permitting even criminal type dis-
covery before trial works a delay in resolution of the fact issues in
a delinquency proceeding, this delay is minimal. Criminal discov-
ery primarily involves the voluntary exchange of information al-
ready in the possession of the state and respondent. For
118. E.g., DEL. FAM. CT. R. 150. "Recognizing the unique nature of the Court's
jurisdiction and the need for a speedy determination thereof, the prompt exchange
of information and documents by parties prior to trial is encouraged."
119. See note 31, supra. See also Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-
evaluation, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 47 (1967), in which the author advocates the adoption
of criminal rather than civil rules of pretrial discovery on the theory that "the very
limited period of time available in the processing of a juvenile court case and the
quasi-criminal nature of juvenile court proceedings make it of dubious wisdom to
make the full range of discovery of civil cases available." Id. at 87.
120. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, AND A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973).
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id. at 40-42.
123. Thus, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act provides that it is the purpose of the
Act "to secure for each minor subject hereto such care and guidance, preferably in
his own home, as will serve the moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare of
the minor and the best interests of the community." (Emphasis added). ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1973).
[Vol. 7: 897, 19801 Juvenile Discovery
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
example, in all liklihood the statements of respondent, co-respon-
dents, and witnesses, were secured during the police investiga-
tory phase, which preceded the filing of the delinquency petition.
The same holds true for other discoverable material, such as doc-
umentary and scientific evidence. Thus, the filing of a routine mo-
tion or request for this type of information can be done almost
immediately and without the need for court intervention or exces-
sive turnover time.
This situation differs markedly from the time considerations in-
volved when depositions are permitted. While the time for depo-
sition taking can be statutorily restricted, it is well recognized
that whenever a discovery procedure requires that several per-
sons, such as opposing lawyers, third-party witnesses, and clients
be physically gathered together, delays due to scheduling con-
flicts, illness, and unavailability are inevitable. Indeed, continu-
ances become the rule rather than the exception. Such delays
have a negative effect on one of the primary objectives of the ju-
venile court system-the speedy adjudication of delinquency is-
sues.
In addition to time considerations, the costly nature of deposi-
tions raises separate problems in the juvenile court context.
First, in civil cases the mutual availability of the deposition
means generally that both litigants feel the impact of the expense
to a relatively equal degree. In criminal and juvenile cases, how-
ever, there is almost always a significant imbalance in the re-
source capabilities of the state and the individual accused. Thus,
the state would always be in a better position to depose exten-
sively than would a minor.
On the other side of the coin, a significant number of children
accused of criminal conduct fall within the indigency catagory.
Assuming that principles of fundamental fairness would require
the state to pay an indigent respondent's deposition costs, those
costs, excluding consideration of any abuse of deposition use by
dilatory respondents, 124 could impact negatively on the juvenile
124. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice rejected the idea that a criminal
defendant should have the right to take depositions in part because "in many
cases the cost of the defense must be borne by the state; and it would be mani-
festly unfair to grant the right only to defendants who are able to finance their
own defense." ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY
AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TMAL 87 (Draft, 1969).
justice system. Resources otherwise available for carrying out
fundamental juvenile court aims, including the establishment of
diversionary and rehabilitative programs, logically would have to
be at least partially rechanneled to underwrite the high-priced
deposition process. It is questionable whether this strain on the
court system can be justified where relatively inexpensive crimi-
nal-type discovery is available as a viable alternative.
It seems reasonable that a further consequence of permitting
third-party depositions in juvenile delinquency cases would be an
increased reluctance on the part of potential witnesses to become
involved in the prosecution of criminal cases. Proponents of dep-
osition use in criminal and delinquency proceedings suggest that
witness hesitation can be overcome by the use of protective or-
ders to guard against harassment.125 Unfortunately, this stance
fails to take into account the fact that involuntary participation in
pretrial discovery is inhibiting even in the absence of wilful mis-
use of the process. Prosecutors already have a difficult time con-
vincing witnesses to interrupt their daily lives and subject
themselves to the generally unpleasant experience of appearing
in court and being questioned and cross-examined under oath.
Yet the effectiveness of an adversarial criminal justice system is
heavily dependent on the willingness of citizens to become in-
volved in state prosecutions for allegedly criminal conduct. Re-
quiring these same citizens to participate in a pre-adjudication
process which is as personally disruptive as the trial itself, will
most certainly discourage civilian witnesses from coming forward.
Finally, opponents of oral depositions in criminal cases have
worried that "if stated as a right, the need to take depositions
might be construed as part of the adequacy of representation re-
quired by the constitutional right to counsel."126 This potential
problem obviously is of equal concern in delinquency cases.127
In sum, the potential for harm to the basic objectives of the ju-
venile justice system created by the nondiscretionary use of depo-
sitions, outweighs the incremental benefit to the fact finding
125. Id. at 823-24.
126. Id. at 87.
127. Gault established that minors have a constitutional right to representation
by counsel during the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 Language in Gault and Kent, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), while not giving
an express right to counsel to juveniles beyond the adjudicatory phase, lends
strong support to the argument that a minor is entitled to counsel at every signifi-
cant step in the proceeding. The right to counsel, furthermore, implies the right to
effective representation by counsel; hence, the concern that counsel's failure to
take depositions could lead to charges of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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process which depositions would allow. Courts and legislatures,
therefore, should concentrate on fully implementing broad crimi-
nal-type discovery before experimenting with the wholesale use
of civil discovery techniques in delinquency proceedings.

